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This paper examines the principles set out in Simpson v Attorney General (known as Bai gent's case) 
and its companion case of Auckland Unemployed Workers Rights Centre Inc v Attorney General 
which held that a person alleging a breach of the rights affirmed by the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 might be entitled to monetary compensation for that breach notwithstanding the absence 
of a remedies clause in the Act itself The paper examines the decision of the court in Bai gent's case, 
the ambit and application of the Act and the possibility of a wide application to persons and bodies 
exercising public functions, duties or powers and the nature of any compensation that might be 
awarded. The paper also considers developments in New Zealand Law since the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in Baigent 's case and compares developments in New Zealand law with those in other 
common law jurisdictions, notably Ireland, Canada and the United States. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) comprises approximately 
14,500 words. 
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1. Introduction 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was enacted in 1990. The Act had been a long time in 
gestation as the White Paper had been released in 198 5. The Act was significantly different to 
that proposed by the White Paper. It was originally proposed that the Act would be supreme 
law and that it would be entrenched so that no provision could be repealed or amended unless 
the proposal was passed by a majority of75% of the members of the House of Representatives. 
The draft New Zealand Bill of Rights as set out in the White Paper also contained a remedies 
provision modelled ons 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
When the Act was passed into law there was a significant dilution of the original proposals. 
It was merely another act and was not supreme law. It was not entrenched. It did not contain 
a remedies clause. In a paper considering the Act published shortly after it was passed 
Professor Paciocco noted that 
"When it was finally passed, the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 had been sapped 
of most of its vitality, debilitated by concerns relating to the preservation of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the appropriate role of judicial review. " 1 
Consequently there were questions as to whether the Act created a new or express right in itself 
or whether it was merely supportive of existing causes of action in tort and further whether, 
in the absence of an express remedies clause, it was possible to obtain damages for breach of 
the provisions of the Act and if so, what type of damages were available. 
In Simpson v Attorney-Genera/2 (known as Baigen/ 's case) and Auckland Unemployed 
Workers' Rights Centre Inc v Attorney-Genera? the Court of Appeal held that a person 
alleging a breach of the rights affirmed by the Act might be entitled to monetary compensation 
2 
3 
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for that breach thereby defeating the statutory immunity provisions the crown would otherwise 
be able to rely on and in effect, putting back into the Act, the remedies clause which Parliament 
had removed. 
In a draft report prepared by the Law Commission in April, 19964 the Law Commission 
considered whether Parliament should abolish the Baigent remedy by legislation. They 
concluded it should not. The Law Commission acknowledged that one reason of principle 
supporting abolition was that the Baigent ruling flouted Parliament' s intent but said if that was 
so, it was not necessarily an argument for legislating against the remedy saying 
"The provision of an appropriate remedy is a critical aspect of giving reality to the Bill. 
Without appropriate remedies, the Bill would not be what the executive proposed and 
Parliament purported to enact: a statement of fundamental rights of New Zealanders, 
constraining the power of the State (in the absence, of course, of overriding legislation) 
and enforced by the courts. Appropriate remedies - including the rejection of evidence, 
the ordering of habeas corpus, the terminating of a trial, the declaration of illegality, the 
award of a monetary remedy - are all essential means of emphasising that the State is 
subject to the law."5 
Baigent's Case 
Briefly the facts of Bai gent's case were that a party of police armed with a search warrant went 
to an address in Korokoro in Lower Hutt. The police thought they were going to the address 
of a known drug dealer named O'Brien but the property was owned and occupied by Mrs. 
Baigent and her family who had no connection with O'Brien or drug dealing. The allegations 
were that the police on realising they had made a mistake decided to proceed with the search 
with a detective in charge of the party of police saying to a Wellington barrister, who happened 
to be the daughter of Mrs. Baigent, that "we often get it wrong, but while we are here we will 
have a look around anyway" . 
4 "Crown liability: Baige111 's case judicial immunity" - Law Commission I April , 1996 
N4, P 24 
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The plaintiff commenced proceedings for negligent procurement of a search warrant, trespass, 
abuse of process and for breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act claiming damages under 
that head as well as the actions founded in tort. The claim under the Act was struck out and the 
matter came on for review before Greig J. He dismissed the application for review saying at 
page 24 of his judgment 
"In my opinion any cause of action based on the Bill of Rights and its breach, where as 
here the conduct complained of is an action of an individual official exercising or 
purporting to exercise his authorised function and is in any event conduct which can 
readily fit into existing categories and types of tort such as trespass, nuisance, negligence 
and so on, will sound in tort and not in some new and separate nomination of public 
law."6 
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeal. If Greig J. ' s decision was affirmed then the 
Crown was protected bys 6(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 which protected it from 
liability in respect of the execution of judicial process by police officers. Execution of a search 
warrant issued by a judicial officer came within the scope of "judicial process". In the Court 
of Appeal Cooke J. was not concerned at the absence of a remedies provision in the Act saying 
"In other jurisdictions compensation is a standard remedy for human rights violations. There 
is no reason for New Zealand jurisprudence to lag behind."
7 He relied on the long title of the 
Act and the affirmation of New Zealand ' s commitment to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights ("the International Covenant") by which each state undertook to ensure 
an effective remedy for violation of rights and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy. 
Cooke P (as did Hardie Boys J) believed that the remedies clause was not carried forward into 
the legislation from the White Paper at it was too closely associated with the idea of supreme 
law overriding Parliament. 
Casey J. also relied ons 2(3) of the International Covenant and a covenant contained therein 
guaranteeing an effective remedy for breach of rights. He accepted that the act had a right-
6 Bai gent v Attom ey-General (High Court , 15-7-93; Greig J., Wellington CP 850/9 1) 
7 N2,P676 
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centred approach and that it was to be given a generous interpretation. His view of the act was 
that Parliament did not intend "it to be what most would regard as legislative window-dressing, 
of no practical consequence, in the absence of appropriate remedies for those whose rights and 
freedoms have been violated" . 8 
In a wide ranging judgment Hardie Boys J. considered jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, 
notably Ireland, which has a written constitution guaranteeing fundamental rights but which 
contains no provision for remedy for infringement and the United States and noted that "This 
Court has been consistent in the view that the terms of the covenant and the terms of the Bill 
ofRights Act itselfrequire a rights-centred response to infringements."
9 and that although in 
some cases a remedy such as the exclusion of evidence will be sufficient where, in other cases, 
no such remedy is available then monetary compensation was an appropriate and effective 
remedy. Hardie Boys J echoed Casey J's comments saying " It is not likely to be accepted that 
a statute expressing the fundamentals of a civilised society be little more than sounding brass 
or tinkling cymbal."10 McKay J. also emphasised the need for an effective remedy saying 
"What is more difficult to comprehend, however, is that Parliament should solemnly 
confer certain rights which are not intended to be enforceable either by prosecution or 
civil remedy, and can therefore be denied or infringed with impunity. Such a right would 
exist only in name, but it would be a misnomer to call it a right, as it would be without 
substance. The maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, where there is a right there is a remedy, has 
a long history." 11 
There was one dissentingjudgment, namely that of Gault J. His Honour was of the view that 
the Act was to augment existing ' traditional ' remedies rather than establish a new cause of 
action with remedies thereunder. He said "In my view the preferable approach is to regard the 
Bill of Rights Act as part of the law of the country to be read with, and not separate from, the 
8 N2, P 69 1 
9 N2, P 702 
10 N2, P 693 
II N2, P 71 7 
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existing law." 12 
One consequence of the remedy being found as being one in public law rather than private law 
was that the cause of action was directly against the Crown so that the various statutory 
immunities were rendered nugatory. Liability of the Crown was not through the vicarious 
liability of its servants but rather direct. The immunities granted the Crown under section 6(5) 
of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 were by-passed. 
The court saw the crown as a guarantor of the rights and freedoms set out in the Bill of Rights 
Act. This view of the crown as a guarantor of the Act was put at its highest by Hardie Boys J 
and McKay Jin their judgments. Hardie Boys J observed that the Act was "A commitment by 
the Crown that those who in the three branches of the Government exercise its functions, 
powers and duties will observe the rights that the Bill affirms"
13 while McKay J noted that the 
Crown, as the legal embodiment of the State, was bound to create an effective remedy for 
violation of rights. The Law Commission in its report noted this view of the Crown as a general 
guarantor takes the matter further than a public law imposition of direct liability and means that 
the Crown, in the sense of central government, is liable for breach of the provisions of the Bill 
of Rights Act per se even although it may not have been the wrongdoer at all. 
14 This 
presumably might mean that if a state owned enterprise or entity such as New Zealand Post 
caused a breach of the Act then an action might be able to be maintained not only against the 
transgressor but against the Crown itself as the guarantor of the rights protected by the Act. 
The Law Commission in its report noted that this concept might create difficulty for claims for 
non monetary relief such as an injunction or a declaration in situations where the Crown could 
not direct or control the body against whom relief was also sought. 
12 
13 
14 
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N2, P 711. His Honour had already developed his argument in his judgment in R v Goodwin (1992) 9 
CRNZ 1 (CA) at p 58 where he said "Upon further consideration I would prefer to avoid fashioning 
additional remedies as to the admissibility of evidence where rules already exist. The Bill of Rights Act, at 
least in part, aflirms existing law and existing rules should continue to apply unless they are inconsistent or 
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N2,P 702 
N4,P 18 
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The argument that the Bill of Rights Act imposed on the Crown a commitment in the nature 
of a guarantee is difficult to reconcile with the failure of Parliament to elevate the Bill of Rights 
to the status of supreme law and entrench it as was originally intended. By contrast the 
constitutions of the various West Indian states examined by the Privy Council in Maharaj v 
Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No 2}1 5 a decision heavily relied on by the majority 
judges in Baigent 's case, were far more wide-ranging in their scope. The New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 affirmed human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand and New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant. The constitution of Trinidad and Tobago 
specifically prevented any law or act of Parliament from abrogating, abridging or infringing any 
of the rights or freedoms in the constitution. Other West Indian constitutions, as their Lordships 
noted, were similar16 and after examining the various constitutions and in particular the 
provisions limiting the power of Parliament to enact legislation affecting or abrogating the 
constitutionally guaranteed rights Lord Diplock said 
"It is their Lordships' clear view that the protection afforded was against contravention 
of those rights or freedoms by the state or by some other public authority endowed by 
law with coercive powers. The chapter is concerned with public law, not private law."
17 
Consequently the Crown or the State under the constitution of Trinidad and Tobago and the 
other West Indian Islands did provide some general guarantee or commitment to the rights 
protected by those documents. The failure of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to include 
similar guarantees or commitments and the notion of a document affirming existing rights and 
rights guaranteed by New Zealand acceding to the International Covenant appears far less 
compelling. This is especially so when one considers section 4 of the Act which provides that 
where there is an inconsistency between a provision of the Bill of Rights Act and any other 
legislation the provisions of the other legislation override those of the Bill of Rights Act. It is 
difficult to see how the Crown can be described as a guarantor. After all , the existing rights 
which the Act affirmed were seen as private law rights against which the Crown had, in many 
15 [ 1978] 2 ALL ER 670 
16 Above N 15 at P 676 where there was reference to the constitution of Jamaica 
17 NIS at P 677 
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cases, the benefit of statutory immunities or the immunities of the prerogative. 
The decision, not unexpectedly, attracted considerable academic interest and some academic 
criticism. In a detailed analysis of the history of the legislation leading to the enactment of the 
Bill of Rights Act and of the decision in Baigent itself Professor Smillie saw the Court of 
Appeal's reliance on the absence of remedies clauses in constitutional documents such as the 
constitutions oflreland and the United States as examples of countries where the courts have 
not hesitated to impose remedies including damages as being distinguishable as those countries' 
constitutions are entrenched as supreme law and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is 
not. 18 Professor Smillie noted, somewhat acerbically 
"Ultimately, the decision of the majority in Bai gent 's case rests on a simple assertion that 
the courts are the ultimate guardians of human rights and they must enforce those rights 
regardless of Parliament's intention. This has no more foundation in legal or democratic 
principle than Sir Robin Cooke's controversial assertion that some common law rights 
'lie so deep that not even Parliament could override them' ."
19 
Further Professor Smillie considered that the government might abolish the Baigent cause of 
action by statute, a suggestion which, as has been seen, has been rejected by the Law 
Commission. 
3. Ambit of the Act 
The object of the Act is described in its long title as being an Act "to affirm, protect and 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New Zealand" and to affirm New 
Zealand's commitment to the International Covenant, an international covenant under the 
auspices of the United Nations ratified by New Zealand in 1978 . Although not entrenched the 
Act was given wide scope with section 3 providing that it applies to acts done -
18 
19 
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"(a) By the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the government of New 
Zealand; (b) by any person or body in the performance of any public function, 
power, or duty conferred or imposed on that person or body by or pursuant to 
law." 
The scope is extended further by section 27 which provides as follows : 
"(1) Every person has the right to the observance of the principles of natural justice by 
any tribunal or other public authority which has the power to make a determination 
in respect of that person's rights, obligations or interests protected or recognised 
by law. 
(2) Every person whose rights, obligations or interests protected or recognised by law 
have been affected by a determination of any tribunal or other public authority has 
a right to apply, in accordance with law, for a judicial review of that 
determination." 
In its early years the Act was primarily a tool of criminal practitioners most useful in the area 
of exclusion of evidence against an accused person. However now that Baigent 's case has 
clearly established the right to seek monetary compensation for breach of the Act the usefulness 
of the Act as a tool in civil litigation has been recognised and a number of proceedings have 
been commenced against the Crown and public bodies. The majority of civil proceedings are 
against the police. In the draft report prepared by the Law Commission in April, 1996
20 it was 
noted that since Bai gent's case 3 7 sets of proceedings have been filed in which breach of the 
Bill of Rights are alleged and damages claimed. Of those proceedings 29 were against the 
police. 
Section 3 of the Act appears as it was originally drafted in the White Paper in 1985 . After the 
White Paper was published in April, 1985 it was referred to the Justice and Law Reform 
Committee of Parliament for examination and was there the subject of numerous public 
20 See N4 at appendix A, P I 
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submissions. The principal objection to the draft bill as set out in the White Paper was that it 
was seen to transfer power from parliament to the judiciary with Mr. Graham, now Minister 
of Justice, observing in the introductory debate on the Bill that "In its final deliberations the 
select committee stated 'the power given to the judiciary by the White Paper draft was the 
principal reason for opposition to the proposal' . "
21 
It is interesting to note that in the parliamentary debate on the second reading of the Bill Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer, then Prime Minister, in summarising section 3 of the Bill referred only to the 
scope of remedies applying to acts done by the legislative, executive or judicial branch of the 
New Zealand government and omitted completely the potentially wider scope of application 
contained in section 3(b) saying 
"Fifth, the Bill is not a charter for law suits. Its provisions do not apply as between 
private citizens, citizens will not be able to invoke its provisions in order to sue one 
another. The Bill applies only between the citizen and one of the three branches of 
government, that is to say, the legislative branch of this parliament, particularly the 
executive branch and the judicial branch. Sixth, the Bill creates no new legal remedies for 
Courts to grant. The Judges will continue to have the same legal remedies as they have 
now, irrespective of whether the Bill of Rights is in issue." (Emphasis added).
22 
Section 3 was not modelled on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Section 32 of 
the Charter limits the application of the Charter to bodies similar in scope to section 3(a) of the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 23 
21 
22 
23 
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Section 32 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reads: 
32. - (1) Application of Charter 
This Charter applies 
(a) To the Parliament and government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of 
Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories; 
and 
(b) To the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the 
authority of the legislature of each province. 
12 
Potentially the scope of section 3 (b) of the Act appears wide and capable of reaching beyond 
public bodies. The limits of the jurisdiction have not been considered but the Courts have 
shown that they are willing to entertain Bill of Rights arguments in commercial situations. For 
example the decision ofMcGechan Jin Federated Farmers of NZ (Inc) v NZ Post Limitecf-4 
suggests there is scope for use of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act in the scrutiny of 
commercial decisions. In that case Federated Farmers and a number of other plaintiffs 
challenged the decision of NZ Post to increase the rural delivery service fee. NZ Post Limited 
was a private company incorporated under the Companies Act 195 5 with all shares owned by 
the government but was the successor to a Department of State. The plaintiff farmers who were 
the senders and intended recipients of test letters were said to be persons who possessed the 
right to freedom of expression under section 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
which in the plaintiffs' pleading were stated as "including the freedom to receive information 
and opinions in the form of postal articles addressed to them". It was claimed that NZ Post had 
unlawfully restricted the right to freedom of expression of the plaintiffs and accordingly the 
plaintiffs sought a declaration that the defendant, NZ Post, was in breach of section 14 of the 
act. 
The defendant denied that NZ Post was exercising a "public function" in its rural delivery 
service and also pleaded section 5 of the act, reasonable limitations. That latter plea succeeded 
but McGechan J determined that the defendant company fell within section 3(b) of the Act 
saymg 
24 
:85385 I 
"I would not necessarily regard it as part of the 'executive' branch of the 'government 
of New Zealand' within s 3(a), given the context provided by s 3(b ). The question more 
naturally arises under s 3(b) itself Clearly, NZP is a 'personal body' (it is an incorporated 
company) . . . .I have no difficulty regarding mail handling as a 'public function' . It is 
carried out for the public, in the public interest, and moreover by a company which while 
technically a separate entity presently is wholly owned and ultimately controlled by the 
crown: a 'state owned enterprise' . For Bill of Rights purposes and as an ordinary use of 
Unreported, 1 December, 1992, High Court, Wellington Registry, CP661 /92 
13 
language NZP can and should be regarded as exercising 'public functions' ."
25 
The willingness of the judiciary to adopt a liberal interpretation of the application of the Act 
can be seen from earlier comments in cases such as Ministry Of Transport v Noort; Police v 
Curran26 where Hardie Boys J said 
"Thus there is no reason to deny s 23(1 )(b) that generous and purposive interpretation 
that the nature of this statute, apparent from its long title, demands for all its provisions. 
While not a constitutional document, it is none the less an affirmation and a means of 
promoting principles which are fundamental to every constitutional instrument. Each of 
its provisions should be construed and applied with that in mind."
27 
And where also Cooke P said in the same case 
"Next, any reading of the 1990 Act brings out its special characteristics. Some have 
already been noticed. Two more should be mentioned. First the statement in Part II of 
civil and political Rights in broad and simple language. No doubt that is to emphasise the 
importance which Parliament attaches to their clear expression. It calls for a generous 
interpretation suitable to give individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and 
freedoms referred to ."28 
Similar statements had been made by Cooke Pin R v Te Kira
29 where he said 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
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"I am convinced that in interpreting and applying the Bill of Rights Act the Courts must 
strive to avoid the danger of becoming verbose and evolving fine distinctions. A Bill of 
Rights should be interpreted generously and simply, no matter whether or not it is 
Above N24 at PP 54-55 
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entrenched. Moreover its impact has to be worked out gradually: those who seek from 
the Courts hard and fast and comprehensive formulae at this stage may not be familiar 
with the lessons of international experience." 
(a) Employment law cases 
Bill of Rights arguments have been well received in employment law with one commentator 
noting that 
" ... the specialist legal institutions constituted under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 , 
the Employment Tribunal and Employment Court, frequently take a robust approach ... "
30 
The act has been applied in cases involving Crown Health Enterprises such as Laboratory 
Workers v Capital Coast Health31 and Capital Coast Health v New Zealand Medical 
Laboratory Workers Union Jnc32 but also there are obiter dicta remarks of Goddard CJ in 
Radio Horowhenua Limited v Bradley33 which purport to apply the Act to private sector 
employers. In that decision His Honour said, with reference to the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act, that 
"The Act applies only to persons having public law responsibilities but it is now well 
settled that employers are such persons. "
34 
Dr Roth in his article in the Bill of Rights Bulletin suggests that this approach is "far too 
broad" . 35 At least one other judge of the Employment Court would appear to support that 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
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proposition as in Zinck v Sleepyhead Manufacturing Company
6 Colgan J accepted that Bill 
of Rights arguments were inappropriate in an action by an employee against a corporate 
employer not exercising any public function, power or duty. There appears to be a clear 
divergence of views as to the ambit of the Act between at least two judges of the Employment 
Court. 
The use to which arguments under the Bill of Rights have been put in employment cases can 
be seen in the recent Court of Appeal decisions in Capital Coast Health v New Zealand 
Medical Laboratory Workers Union Jnc37
 and in NZ Fire Service Commission v Jvamy8. Both 
cases involved an attempt to reconcile section 12 of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 , 
which provided that employers or employees in negotiating for an employment contract may 
chose to be represented by a bargaining agent, with sections 14 and 17 of the New Zealand Bill 
of Rights Act which respectively provide for freedom of expression and freedom of association. 
In both cases employers, in conducting negotiations with trade unions, had appealed over the 
head of the union directly to the union ' s members by distributing literature to the members in 
an attempt to influence the course of negotiations with the union. 
In the Capital Coast Health case Hardie Boys J said 
" .. .It is a matter in each case of striking a balance between the competing rights of the 
parties - those of the employer under s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act, and those of the 
employee under s 12 of the ECA [Employment Contracts Act 1991, emphasis added] . 
It is not a case of one prevailing over the other, but of both being given sensible and 
practical effect. That can be done by allowing s 12 to speak for itself I do not think that 
its meaning is greatly assisted by devising tests ... "
39 
The court then considered each communication to see what the purpose of the communication 
36 
37 
38 
39 
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was, principally as to whether it was an attempt to undermine the authority of the other 
bargaining agent and on that factual basis determined whether individual communciations were 
in breach of the Employment Contracts Act. 
In NZ Fire Service Commission v Jvamy the employer had communicated directly with the 
union ' s members at a sensitive point in the bargaining process by distributing by courier an 
information pack to it's employees. Justice Goddard in the Employment Court had granted an 
injunction restraining the employer from communicating directly with the employees in breach 
of s 12(2) of the Employment Contracts 1991. The appeal was allowed and the injunction was 
discharged but the minority, who would have upheld Justice Goddard ' s order, were Lord 
Cooke and Justice Thomas who regarded the distribution of the information pack to the union 
members by the employer as being a breach of the Employment Contracts Act notwithstanding 
the right to freedom of expression in s 14 of the Bill of Rights Act. Thomas J in his dissenting 
judgment tried to strike the balance Hardie Boys J referred to in the Capital Coast Health 
decision by saying 
"It therefore needs to be stressed that, while the right of freedom of expression and the 
right to freedom of association, out of which collective bargaining arises, may influence 
the interpretation of s 12(2), freedom of expression cannot be permitted to lead to an 
interpretation or application of the section which would defeat the objective of enabling 
collective bargaining to operate in terms of the act. The statutory requirements of the act 
must prevail. .. .I regard the conduct of the commission, including the information pack 
distributed to its employees, as being so blatently a breach of s 12(2) that it cannot be 
saved by reference to the commission ' s right to freedom of expression. "
40 
By contrast, Gault J, for the majority (who included Richardson P and Henry J) held that s 
12(2) of the Employment Contracts Act, the right to choose a bargaining agent and to have the 
other party recognise the authority of that agent in negotiations, had to be given a meaning 
"consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights Act (s 6) which 
included the freedom of expression which extends to "the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
40 N38 at P 613 
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information and opinions of any kind and any form" . 
41 
The issue of employers appealing directly to union members over the head of union negotiators 
in negotiations for an employment contract also arose in Airways Corporation of New Zealand 
Limited v Airline Pilots Association IUW2 before the same court in the Court of Appeal as in 
NZ Fire Service Commission. In the decision Thomas J was with the majority with Lord Cooke 
providing the only dissenting judgment and saying that Capital Coast allowed an employer to 
correspond with members of a union directly by providing factual information but nothing 
futher. The information provided by the employer to the union's members included an 
assessment of the proposals of both the employer and the union. 
These cases are interesting both for the restrictive approach taken by Lord Cooke in reading 
down the right to freedom of expression in favour of the right of association to the more 
permissive approach of the majority of the Court of Appeal to Hardie Boys J's reference of the 
need to strike a balance between the two Acts. They are also illustrative of the tension that can 
occur between competing rights and freedoms under the Bill of Rights Act. 
(b) A comparison with judicial review? 
Is it possible then when considering the ambit of the act and its possible application to private 
sector companies or bodies to draw a comparison with the type of bodies subject to judicial 
review? 
In New Zealand the mechanism of judicial review is often determined by section 4 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 which refers to the "exercise, refusal to exercise or proposed 
or purported exercise by any person of a statutory power". Other mechanisms for review are 
the Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 and various provisions of the High Court Rules. 
The width of the power of judicial review was illustrated in the well known case of Finnigan 
41 N38 at P 599 
42 [1 996] 2 NZLR 622 (CA) 
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v New Zealand Rugby Football Union43 where the Court of Appeal determined that two 
members of rugby football clubs which were members of the Auckland Rugby Union which 
itself was affiliated to the New Zealand Rugby Football Union had standing to commence 
proceedings to review a decision of the council of the New Zealand Rugby Football Union to 
accept an invitation to send an All Black team to South Africa in 1985. Cooke P who delivered 
the judgment of the Court of Appeal took note of the importance of the Rugby Union's 
decision in the days of heated argument over sporting ties with South Africa saying "the 
decision affects the New Zealand community as a whole .. . " and 
"While technically a private and voluntary sporting association, the Rugby Union is in 
relation to this decision in a position of major national importance for the reasons already 
outlined. In this particular case, therefore, we are not willing to apply to the question of 
standing the narrowest of criteria that might be drawn from private law fields. In truth 
the case has some analogy with public law issues. This is not to be pressed too far . We 
are not holding that, or even discussing whether, the decision is the exercise of a 
statutory power - although that was argued. We are saying simply that it falls into a 
special area where, in the New Zealand context, a sharp boundary between public and 
private law cannot realistically be drawn."
44 
Clearly the courts have extended judicial review to private organisations whose decisions have 
wide public interest and effect. 
The elasticity of the boundary of judicial review was emphasised by Cooke P in Burt v 
Govemor-Generaf5 where an application for judicial review of the Governor-General's refusal 
to exercise the royal prerogative of mercy was held to be non-justiciable. His Honour held that 
might not always be so saying 
43 
44 
45 
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law review if justice so requires, we are not satisfied that in this field justice does so 
require, at any rate at present. "46 
In an article entitled "Judicial Review of State-Owned Enterprises at the Crossroads"
47 Mai 
Chen noted that the courts have over the last few years been divided as to whether to subject 
state owned enterprise decisions to judicial review but that the recent decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealancf
8 in 
holding that the actions of Electrocorp in terminating an interim agreement with the Auckland 
Electric Power Board for the supply of electricity was not reviewable signalled the end of an 
expansive approach to judicial review. Ms Chen contrasted the reluctance of the courts to 
subject commercial decisions to judicial review with the approach of the courts in Bill of Rights 
cases and their broad and purposive interpretation of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and 
concluded "Thus, in general, the scope of actions that can be challenged under the BORA [New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990] will be broader than under section 4 of the JAA [Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972]. "49 
In IV3 Network Limited v Eveready New Zealand Limitecf'° Cooke P held that TV3 Network 
Limited came within section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights Act as the television company was a 
licensed television broadcaster under the Broadcasting Act 1989 so that, even although it was 
a private company, it performed a public function imposed on it pursuant to law. Clearly it fell 
within the ambit of section 3(b) of the Bill of Rights Act. Mai Chen, in her article noted
51 the 
obiter dicta remarks of Cooke P in Sharma v ANZ Banking Group
52 as indicative that banks 
46 
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might be subjected to the act. It seems clear that banks would be subject to the act and so liable 
to an action for damages for breach of the provisions of the Bill of Rights Act. They would 
clearly fall within the definition of section 3(b) as exercising a "public function" ... "by or 
pursuant to law" . The Bank of New Zealand is constituted under its own Act (Bank ofNew 
Zealand Act 1988) and the other trading banks are registered under the provisions of the 
Reserve Bank ofNew Zealand Act 1989. 
Clearly the ambit of the Act is wide. It does not only apply between the citizen and one of the 
three branches of government. It applies to a wide range of public bodies, to private companies 
exercising public power such as crown health enterprises and state owned enterprises and even 
to private enterprises such as banks, privately owned television stations and other privately 
owned institutions exercising public functions or power. McGechan J had no difficulty in the 
Federated Farmers v New Zealand Post Limited case
53 in finding that New Zealand Post 
Limited, a private company, was exercising a public function in mail handling. banking, 
insurance transactions, rail passage, radio broadcasting and the like would also clearly be 
deemed to be an exercise of a public function. The list would clearly be extensive. Given the 
purposive and active way in which the courts have shown they are prepared to interpret the 
provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 the scope and ambit of the act is clearly 
very wide and possibly more useful to plaintiffs than traditional remedies such as judicial 
review. 
Consequently in considering whether a person or body falls within section 3(B) of the Bill of 
Rights Act the approach has to be whether the act complained of amounts to a 'public' 
function, power or duty and if so, whether it is confirmed or imposed, on the person or body 
exercising it by or pursuant to law, by statute or otherwise. 
The Concept of Public Law Compensation 
The majority judgments in Baigent 's case felt that compensation against the state for breaches 
do not venture further for the purposes of the present judgmcnt." 
53 AboveN24 
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of affirmed human, civil or political rights is a public law remedy and not a form of vicarious 
liability for tort. The Court of Appeal in Bai gent's case followed the Privy Council decision in 
Maharaj v Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago (No. 2) . 
54 In that case a barrister in the 
West Indies was gaoled for seven days for contempt of court by a judge. There was a 
constitutional right not to be deprived of liberty save by due process of law and subsequently 
it was found that there had been a failure of natural justice as before making the order 
imprisoning the barrister the Judge had not told him plainly enough what he had done to enable 
him to explain or excuse his conduct. Lord Diplock found that the claim was not one in private 
law against the judge or against the state for the actions of the judge but rather was one in 
public law saying at page 679 of the judgment: 
"The claim for redress ... for what has been done by a judge is a claim against the state 
for what has been done in the exercise of the judicial power of the state. This is not 
vicarious liability; it is a liability of the state itself It is not a liability in tort at all ; it is a 
liability in the public law of the state, not of the judge himself, which has been newly 
created by section 6( 1) and (2) of the Constitution. "
55 
The court noted that as the barrister had long since served his sentence of imprisonment the 
only practical form ofredress was monetary compensation even although there was no express 
provision for monetary compensation in the constitution. 
The court considered what type of compensation might be available. Lord Diplock noted 
54 
55 
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"The claim is not a claim in private law for damages for the tort of false imprisonment, 
under which the damages recoverable are at large it would include damages for loss of 
reputation. It is a claim in public law for compensation for depravation of liberty alone. 
Such compensation would include any loss of earnings consequent on the imprisonment 
and recompense for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the appellant during his 
NIS 
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incarceration. " 56 
As exemplary damages were not claimed the court did not express a view as to whether 
monetary compensation for breach of an affirmed right under the constitution of the Island state 
could include an exemplary punitive award. However there are indications from cases which 
have reached the Privy Council from the West Indies that exemplary damages are not available 
although the issue is still open. For example in Reynolds v Attorney-General for St Christopher, 
Nevis & Anguilla57 the appellant had been detained for some weeks during a state of 
emergency. He subsequently sued for damages for false imprisonment and for compensation 
for breach of his constitutional right not to be subjected to unlawful detention. The respondent 
had been awarded $18, OOO. 00 which included an unspecified sum in the award as exemplary 
damages. The award was upheld by the Privy Council as capable of accruing under the tort of 
false imprisonment although they accepted a submission from counsel for the Attorney-General 
that exemplary damages would not have been available had the action been founded solely on 
the breach of the constitutional provision. However as the constitution of St Christopher , 
Nevis & Anguilla specifically allowed traditional remedies to co-exist with an action under the 
remedies provision of the constitution their Lordships were content to dismiss the Attorney-
General's appeal. 
Similarly in Jaundoo v Attorney-General of Guyana
58 where land had been compulsorily taken 
from the appellant without compensation in breach of the constitution of Guyana the Privy 
Council held that as the road was nearly complete the only form of compensation could be a 
money payment to the appellant as compensatory damages for the loss caused her by the 
Government's actions . Damages were viewed as being solely compensatory. 
Exemplary damages were described by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnarcf9 as being 
" ... essentially different from ordinary damages. The object of damages in the usual sense of the 
56 
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term is to compensate. The object of exemplary damages is to punish and deter."
60 Lord Devlin 
described one of the categories in which exemplary damages could be awarded as being where 
conduct was oppressive, arbitrary or by way of an unconstitutional action by servants of the 
government. The Privy Council in Maharaj clearly saw public law compensation as being 
essentially compensatory with exemplary damages being available in private law actions alone 
although as noted the Privy Council did not need to determine the point as exemplary damages 
were not claimed in that case. Their Lordships' decision in Reynolds v Attorney-Generaf'
1 also 
emphasises that the Privy Council sees exemplary damages as limited to private law actions for 
damages for false imprisonment, misfeasance in public office and other traditional tort claims. 
Although the issue has not yet been determined by the Privy Council the indications given by 
their Lordships would, it is suggested, carry considerable weight with the New Zealand Courts. 
The Court of Appeal in Baigent 's case drew heavily on their Lordships' judgment in Maharaj 
and in earlier Bill of Rights decisions on the judgment of the Privy Council in Minister of Home 
Affairs v Fisher'2 where their Lordships held that a constitution should be construed with less 
rigidity and more generosity than other acts. This latter decision was relied on by both 
Richardson J and Cooke P in Ministry of Transport v Noori; Police v Curran
63 and also by 
Cooke Pin his judgement in R v Goodwin64 . 
Exemplary damages are available, as will be seen, in the Canadian jurisdiction for claims under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However Canadian courts appear to have 
adopted a private rather than public law approach to claims under the Charter, although as with 
much other Canadian law on the Charter, the subject is characterised by uncertainty with 
conflicting decisions either way. 
No award of damages was made in Bai gent's case as the claim reached the Court of Appeal 
60 N52, P407 
61 Above NSl 
62 [1980) AC 31 9 
63 Above N26 at PP 122 and 132 
64 (1992) 9 CRNZ I PP 18, 26 
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by way of appeal against a successful striking out action. Further since Bai gent's case there 
has been no award of damages or monetary compensation by a court in New Zealand for 
breach of the provisions of the Bill of Rights Act. The judgments in Baigent 's case are, 
however, of considerable interest for their individual views on the issue of damages or 
compensation. It seems clear from all of the judgments that the award of damages for breach 
of the act will be discretionary. Hardie Boys J's views echoed those of Lord Diplock when in 
Baigent 's case he said "In the assessment of the compensation the emphasis must be on the 
compensatory and not the punitive element. The objective is to affirm the right, not punish the 
transgressor. "65 
Casey J emphasised the discretionary nature of the remedy while Cooke P said " ... I think that 
it would be premature at this stage to say more than that, in addition to any physical damage, 
intangible harm such as distress and injured feelings may be compensated for; the gravity of the 
breach and the need to emphasise the importance of the affirmed rights and to deter breaches 
are also proper considerations; but extravagant awards are to be avoided. "
66 
Support for Cooke P's proposition that the remedy should not merely be compensatory but 
should also be awarded to emphasise the importance of the rights in the Bill of Rights Act and 
to deter future breaches can be drawn from Ashby v White
67 in which the dissentingjudgment 
of ChiefJustice Holt was subsequently upheld in the House of Lords. The defendant in the case 
was the Returning Officer who had refused to admit the plaintiff's vote in an election for 
members of Parliament. The defendant succeeded in the initial trial for various reasons 
including a failure to show actual hurt or damage. In his dissenting judgment Holt CJ said "If 
the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it" and 
"want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal".
68 Holt CJ held that hindering a man in his 
65 
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right amounted to damage and the need to deter public officers from failing to observe 
constitutional rights meant that damages were available to the plaintiff. The decision was relied 
on by several of the Judges in Baigent 's case, notably McKay J who cited extracts from Holt 
CJ'sjudgment saying "The common sense of that decision applies equally to the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act."69 Ashby v White has been held to provide for damages without proof of 
actual loss for invasion of an absolute right. 
70 
Nevertheless, in common law, damages are generally only available to redress consequential 
injury or loss flowing from the violation of a right. Interference with a right, without proof of 
actual injury is generally not compensatable other than by nominal damages. The common law 
position is stated in McGregor on Damages as being71 "the proper approach is to regard an 
injuria or wrong as entitling the plaintiff to a judgment for damages in his favour even without 
loss or damage, but where there is no loss or damage such judgment will be for nominal 
damages only."72 
Cooke P's observation that "the need to emphasise the importance of the affirmed rights and 
to deter breaches" is clearly an indication that awards are not to be seen as being solely 
compensatory and that awards akin to exemplary damages in private law actions may be 
available. However, in Martin v District Court at Tauranga
73 Richardson J when discussing 
the proposition whether the prima facie remedy for breach of some provisions of the Bill of 
Rights Act should be money damages said "But the objective is to vindicate human rights, not 
69 
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to punish or discipline those responsible for the breach". 74 Richardson J appears to be firmly 
with those who would allow damages to be only compensatory in nature and not punitive or 
deterrent. But the point is still open. 7s 
Cooke P also emphasised the necessity to avoid any element of double recovery so that if 
damages were to be awarded on private law causes of actions not based on the Bill of Rights 
Act the damages must be allowed for in any award of compensation under the Act. Cooke P 
also suggested that "A legitimate alternative approach, having the advantage of simplicity, 
would be to make a global award under the Bill of Rights Act and nominal or concurrent 
awards on any other successful causes of action."76 This approach was approved by McKay J 
in his judgment where he emphasised that a claim for breach of the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights Act could co-exist with traditional tort remedies but that "The same damages may be 
recoverable by either route.'m McKay J also emphasised the discretionary nature of the remedy. 
The type of compensation that might be awarded has been considered in Jackson v The 
Attorney-General78 where a claim was brought by a headmaster who had lost his position as 
a result of publicity arising from his appearance before Justices of the Peace on an unopposed 
bail application before he had the opportunity of taking legal advice. After his appearance he 
was able to instruct a solicitor who obtained a name suppression order but there had already 
been publicity which led to the loss of his job. He claimed, inter alia, for compensation for past 
and future loss of his salary and for general damages for loss of employment opportunity and 
74 
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status as well as for exemplary damages. The case came before the court on a pre-trial 
application for determination of a point of law. The court accepted that a claim could include 
a claim for loss of future earnings and employment opportunities. The court did not deal with 
the issue as to whether exemplary damages could be claimed, although crown counsel based 
his argument on the thesis that in any claim for public law compensation founded on a breach 
or breaches of the act exemplary damages were not recoverable and neither, he submitted, were 
damages for future economic loss or loss of opportunity. 
In his judgment in Bai gent's case Cooke P clearly stated that monetary compensation for 
breach of the Bill of Rights Act is not "pecuniary damages" within the meaning of the 
Judicature Act 1908, section 19A. He said "That section is referring to common law damages, 
not public law compensation."79 That meant that there was no prima facie right to trial by jury 
in claims in civil proceedings where Bill of Rights relief is sought. Casey J also accepted the 
trial was to be by way of judge alone as did Hardie Boys J. However one other consequence 
of the court holding that monetary compensation for breach of the Bill of Rights is not 
"pecuniary damages" is that a claim for such compensation would not amount to "proceedings 
for damages" in terms of the bar on civil proceedings for damages arising from personal injury 
covered by the accident compensation scheme. Section 14( 1) of the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 bars proceedings for damages arising directly or 
indirectly for personal injury covered by the accident compensation legislation. It has been 
suggested by several commentators that where the personal injury is caused by a breach of the 
Bill of Rights then the bar on proceedings for damages contained in section 14 of the Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act can be avoided by suing for compensation for 
breach of the Bill of Rights Act. 80 
One difficulty, however, is that the civil rights protected by the Bill of Rights Act are somewhat 
limited in scope being essentially those covered by sections 8 to 11 which include the right not 
to be deprived of life, the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel treatment and rights in 
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relation to medical or scientific experimentation and the right to refuse to undergo medical 
treatment. Consequently the scope to mount a claim for damages for personal injury under the 
guise of the Bill of Rights Act is not particularly great and is most likely to be of benefit to the 
estates or relatives of deceased persons suing where the deceased' s life has been lost as a result 
of negligence of one of the class of persons covered by the act. 
Cooke P, Hardie Boys and Casey J refer to the remedy as "compensation". McKay J refers to 
"damages or monetary compensation". The distinction seems to be made to emphasise the 
divide between the concepts of common law damages and public law compensation. 
5. Is only one Remedy Available? 
In Baigent 's case there could be no other remedy but compensation. No criminal charges 
followed the search and so there was no evidence to suppress or criminal prosecution to stay 
or dismiss. The issue of more than one remedy did not arise. Monetary compensation could 
be the only remedy. 
The emphasis in Baigent 's case was, however, very much on the need for an effective remedy, 
particularly having regard to New Zealand's obligations under article 2(3) of the International 
Covenant whereby each State party had undertaken, inter alia, to ensure an effective remedy 
for violation of rights. 
In Baigent 's case Cooke P noted that the New Zealand act did not have an express provision 
about remedies but said "The ordinary range of remedies will be available for their enforcement 
and protection. "81 
The ordinary range of remedies would include stay of proceedings, exclusion of evidence in 
criminal cases, declarations, injunctions and in appropriate cases monetary compensation. There 
is nothing in the words used by Cooke P to indicate that the court had in mind that only one 
remedy of the range of remedies would be available to a person whose rights had been 
81 N2, P 676 
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infringed. The emphasis is on providing an effective remedy and if it transpires that more than 
one remedy is required then there would appear to be no good reason for any limitation to a 
sole remedy. 
Martin v District Court of Tauranga82 was a case where the Court of Appeal considered an 
application for a stay of proceedings for delay in bringing an accused person to trial. The 
appellant (the application had been unsuccessful in the High Court before Blanchard J) had 
been arrested on charges of sexual violation in December, 1992 but as at May, 1994, when the 
application was made to the District Court at Tauranga, had not been brought to trial although 
a trial date had been allocated for some weeks later. There had been earlier trial dates allocated 
but they had been either unilaterally abandoned by the Crown for inadequate reason or had not 
been able to proceed because of unavailability of courts or judges. The case was an example 
of systemic delay abetted by a crown solicitor's unilateral decision to cancel a scheduled trial 
date. 
The court accepted that the appellant's right under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act to be 
tried without undue delay (section 25(b)) had been breached and then considered what remedy 
was available. It held that a stay of proceedings was the appropriate remedy. Neither Cooke 
P or Hardie Boys J favoured letting the trial proceed but compensating the appellant by an 
award of damages with Hardie Boys noting the problems that might pose saying "That has 
conceptual problems. It would of necessity be after trial and the notio~ of an award of damages 
to a person who has been found guilty presents some difficulty."
83 
The court noted the Canadian position as represented by R v Moran84 that a stay of proceedings 
was not the only remedy for infringement of the right but the Court was reluctant to consider 
any other remedy. Richardson J in his judgment said "The choice of remedies should be to the 
values underlying the particular right. The remedy or remedies granted should be proportional 
82 N65 
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to the particular breach and should have regard to other aspects of the public interest. "85 
It is clear that the court will, in appropriate instances, consider more than one remedy. The 
emphasis would appear to be on proportionality to the particular breach. Consequently in 
criminal cases where evidence has been obtained in breach of the Bill of Rights Act, prima facie, 
exclusion of that evidence would appear to be the remedy proportional to the breach and has 
been the remedy commonly adopted by the courts. 86 Although the court in Martin v District 
Court at Tauranga indicated that a stay was the effective remedy for systemic delay it is 
conceivable that an abuse of the rights guaranteed by the act or delay might be so gross as 
would entitle a court to deal with the criminal prosecution by exclusion of evidence or stay of 
proceedings and also award damages if the particular breach required that degree of 
proportionality. 
Clearly the range of remedies, the appropriateness of one remedy or more than one remedy is 
related to the particular breach so that it is also conceivable in civil proceedings for there to be 
injunctions and declarations as well as monetary compensation. 
Developments in New Zealand Law since Baigent's Case 
The most significant development has been the decision of Eichelbaum CJ in Whithair v 
Attorney-General81 which clarified the question as to whether a claim could be maintained 
against the Crown for mere breach so that it was unnecessary to show that the infringer was 
negligent, reckless or perhaps malicious in infringing the plaintiff's rights. 
The issue did not arise in Baigent 's case as were the allegations there to be proved there could 
be no question that the breach there was other than deliberate and in 'bad faith' . 
85 
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Whithair had been arrested on a Friday afternoon on a charge of male assaults female and was 
refused police bail because of a policy directive in the local police district to refuse bail to 
persons charged with what were classified as domestic violence offences. The police arrested 
him in Paraparaumu and transported him on the Friday evening to Porirua but did not arrange 
for a court in Porirua to be convened the following morning to hear a bail application or 
alternatively transport him to Wellington where a court was sitting. 
On the criminal charge Whithair was dealt with in the Porirua District Court. He pleaded guilty 
and was given a discharge under s 19 of the Criminal Justice Act. He commenced proceedings 
against the police for false imprisonment, misfeasance in a public office and damages for breach 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. The relevant provisions of the Act that were said to 
have been breached were s 23(3) (right of an arrested person to be brought as soon as possible 
before a Court or competent tribunal) and s 22 (the right not to arbitrarily detained). The 
Court of Appeal had earlier in R v Greenaway88 stated that the effect of s 23(3) of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act was that the police were obliged to advise an arrested person of his 
right to seek bail and that a special sitting for that purpose could be arranged for a Saturday 
if the arrested person required it. The court left open the question as to whether the police were 
obliged to transport the arrested person to another court if a bail hearing could not be arranged 
in the court in which the information had been laid. In Whithair Eichelbaum CJ said that the 
provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act and analogous provisions in the Crimes Act 
1961 meant that a technical approach to the question of venue needed to be avoided on 
considering the issue of bail. His Honour said that if a defendant wished to have the opportunity 
to seek bail the obligations of the police included bringing that person before another court if 
reasonably practical to do so, if the court before which the defendant would otherwise have 
been brought was not sitting or available to sit at the relevant time. 
On the more important issue as to whether damages lie for mere breach His Honour said: 
88 
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judgments in Simpson's case there is not so much as a hint that the plaintiff had to 
establish any element additional to proving a breach of the right in question. "89 
He further observed: 
"I of course must accept (and can do so without difficulty) the conclusion that 
notwithstanding the absence of any express provision, the legislature must have intended 
that the Courts should work out appropriate remedies for breaches of the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act. Where no other appropriate response is available, damages for the 
breach is seen as the proper remedy. The argument however is that the Courts are to 
circumscribe the remedy with some addition requirement. I am unable to see a principal 
basis for that, in the absence of any trace of a legislative intention to that effect. 90 
In a review of the decision in the Bill of Rights Bulletin Tracey Hawe said 
"The Court affirmed that a claim for damages does not require conscious violation of 
rights, bad faith, or reckJess indifference to a person's rights by the State. All government 
agencies whose actions may impinge upon the rights of people under the act should take 
note of this, as the potential for damages claims may grow accordingly."91 
7. Other Jurisdictions 
(a) Ireland 
Ireland has a written constitution which guarantees fundamental human rights. However no 
remedies clause for breach of those rights is contained in the constitution. In Baigent 's case 
Hardie Boys J referred to cases from a number of jurisdictions including Ireland noting that the 
absence of a remedies clause had "not prevented the Courts from developing remedies, 
89 
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including the award of damages, not only against individuals guilty of infringement, but against 
the state itself. 92 
The Irish Constitution contains in articles 40 to 44, a body of provisions described as 
"fundamental rights". The constitution creates the basic institutions of the Irish state. Article 
40.3 provides: 
"1 The state guarantees in its laws to respect, and so far as practicable, by its laws to 
defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
2. The state shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack 
and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good name and 
property rights of every citizen." 
Consequently the State acts as a guarantor of the rights guaranteed to the people of Ireland 
under the Irish Constitution. 
The leading case, which holds that an action lies by an individual for breach of his or her 
constitutional rights, is Meske II v Caras Iompair Eireann93 where a number of trade unions 
entered into an agreement with an employer whereby the employer would discharge its existing 
employees and only re-engage them if they agreed to become members of the respective trade 
unions. The plaintiff was not re-employed by the defendants as he refused to accept the element 
of compulsion to join one of the unions. It was held that this amounted to an attempt by the 
defendants to coerce the plaintiff to abandon his right of disassociation and that was a violation 
of the fundamental law of the State and accordingly was unlawful. Walsh J. said 
92 
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in Byrne v Ireland that a right guaranteed by the constitution or granted by the 
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may not fit into any of the ordinary forms of action in either common law or equity and 
that the constitutional right carries within it its own right to a remedy or for the 
enforcement of it. "94 
In Conway v Irish Teachers Organisation95 the Irish Supreme Court held that damages for 
breach of the rights guaranteed by the Irish constitution can include punitive or exemplary 
damages with Finlay CJ saying they were intended: 
" ... to mark the court's particular disapproval of the defendant's conduct in all the 
circumstances of the case and its decision that it should publicly be seen to have punished 
the defendant for such conduct by awarding such damages, quite apart from its 
obligation, where it may exist in the same case, to compensate the plaintiff for the 
damage which he or she has suffered."96 
In Conway's case Findlay CJ held that damages could also be: 
(1) Ordinary compensatory damages. 
(2) Aggravated damages by reason of the way in which the wrong was committed, involving 
such elements as oppressiveness, arrogance or outrage, the defendant's conduct after the 
commission of the wrong and the conduct of the defendant in his defence. 
(3) Punitive or exemplary damages. 
In Conway, a case which involved actions on behalf of school children against the Irish National 
Teachers Organisation for damages for breach of the plaintiffs' constitutional right to an 
education, compensatory damages were rewarded reflecting missed educational opportunities, 
and exemplary damages of £1 ,500.00 per student were assessed, making a total of £100,000.00 
94 
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for the 70 plaintiffs involved. 
In Kennedy v Irelarul7 damages in the sum of £20,000.00 for each of the first two plaintiffs and 
£10,000.00 for the third plaintiff were awarded in an action which concerned tapping of their 
telephones (the plaintiffs were all political journalists) by the Minister for Justice. The 
constitutional right breached was a right to privacy. 
Consequently Irish courts are prepared to give substantial damages for breaches of 
constitutional rights. Furthermore remedies are not only against the state itself but also available 
against individuals who breach a plaintiff's constitutional rights. However some actual damage 
must be suffered and there do not appear to be damages for breach of a constitutional right per 
se, for example in Meskell the plaintiff was held entitled "to such damages as may, upon 
inquiry, be proved to have been sustained by him. "98 There is some academic disputation of this 
with it being stated "If violation of a constitutional right on its own does not afford a cause of 
action, the intrinsic value of the right is not secured ."99 
The. action is seen as a private law action rather than one in public law. Liability of the State 
is seen as vicarious and not direct. In Cooney v Jreland1 00, a case about mail censorship for 
prisoners Costello J held 
"The wrong that was committed in this case was an unjustified infringement of a 
constitutional right, not a tort; and it was committed by a servant of the State and 
accordingly Ireland can be sued in respect of it. " 101 
Interestingly, the Irish courts seem to have adopted the dissenting judgment in Maharaj in 
support of their view that there is no direct liability of the state but rather vicarious liability for 
97 
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its servants' breach of the provisions of the constitution. In Deighan v Ireland102 Flood J held 
that there was no liability on the part of the State because the judicial officer who had 
committed the wrong enjoyed judicial immunity. 103 Consequently Irish law, despite the absence 
of a remedies provision, has taken a proactive approach to issues of liability for breach of the 
constitution and to damages. Exemplary damages seem to be awarded on the same basis as they 
would be in tort which accords with the Irish view that the remedy is one in private law and not 
public law. 
(b) Canada 
The United Kingdom Canada Act 1982 by which the Canadian Constitution Act 1982 was 
passed contained a charter of rights and freedoms guaranteeing fundamental human rights and 
also rights for various minorities in Canada. The Charter has a specific remedies clause. It reads 
as follows: 
"24- (1) Enforcement of guaranteed rights and freedoms 
Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this charter have been infringed or 
denied may apply to a Court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the 
Court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances." 
The Canadian courts have adopted a private law rather than public law approach although as 
Hardie Boys J noted in his judgment in Bai gent's case 104 there appears to be some division of 
opinion on this. 
Punitive or exemplary damages have been awarded. In Crossman v R 105 the court awarded 
102 
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$500.00 punitive damages to a plaintiff who had been refused access to a lawyer by a 
policeman until after he had made a statement. Nothing incriminating was contained in the 
statement and as the plaintiff pleaded guilty in any event the taking of the statement for 
subsequent use in the proceedings was not in issue. There was no actual damage as a result of 
the interview as the plaintiff pleaded guilty. The court viewed the matter as being a tort 
committed by the police against the plaintiff and exemplary damages were available to vindicate 
the plaintiff's rights. In Lord v Allison106 the same sum was awarded for a breach of the 
Charter where the police had used excessive force and in Rollinson v Canada107 the court held 
that damages would be available together with exemplary damages for a serious and flagrant 
breach of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
However, the issue as to whether damages are available for breach of Charter rights per se is 
still not settled. In Vespoli v The Queen108 the Federal Court of Appeal rejected a claim for 
damages for infringement of the Charter prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure on the 
grounds that it could "find in the record no solid evidence that the appellants really suffered as 
a consequence of the illegal seizures."109 
A strong advocate for damages for breach of Charter rights per se has been the Canadian 
academic Marilyn Pilkington who in several articles has argued for a remedy in damages under 
the Charter to vindicate infringement of a constitutional right. 11 0 In an article entitled 
"Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" 
she said 
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constitutional rights will be pursued in the Courts. In these cases, the constitution will 
have been breached with impunity .... where damages are employed as a constitutional 
rather than a common law remedy, they should be available not only to compensate for 
consequential losses but to redress the infringement of the right itself 111 
In Canada there is division among the courts as to whether a conscious violation of the 
plaintiff's rights is necessary under the Charter before damages can be awarded. In Stenner v 
British Colombia (Securities Commission/ 12 mere breach was said to be a defence to an 
allegation of a Charter violation with Spencer J in his judgment in the Supreme Court of British 
Colombia saying 
"In my opinion therefore the defence of good faith is available in this case to a claim for 
damages under s.24(1) and should be taken into account in deciding whether damages 
are an appropriate and just remedy to any claimed Charter breach." 11 3 
However that was not accepted in Lewis v Burnaby School District 11 4 or in Guimond v 
Attorney-General of Quebec115. Lewis v Burnaby School District was an earlier decision of the 
Supreme Court of British Colombia and Lander J, when considering the policy reasons 
underlying the good faith defence, said that they "should give way to the vindication of Charter 
rights" 116 and held that allowing public officials to rely on a good faith defence would deny a 
remedy to persons whose Charter rights had been infringed. 
Canadian courts do not seem to be limited to one remedy when seeking to create an effective 
remedy. In Persaud v Donaldson117 damages under the Charter, being the costs of a criminal 
111 N106, at P 539 
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trial, were awarded even although evidence obtained in breach of the Charter had been 
excluded in the course of the trial and the plaintiffs had been acquitted as a result. Charter 
damages were also available even when a stay of proceedings had been granted in Moore v 
Ontario. 118 
In their review of damages for breach of individual rights119 Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth 
noted a number of cases where damages were held to be inappropriate as an additional remedy 
to ones already granted in criminal proceedings such as in R v Young120 where costs were 
refused where evidence had already been excluded and where the court noted the accused's 
obvious guilt. 
The emphasis in these cases seems to be on the need to fashion a remedy or remedies 
proportionate to the breach so that in some cases more than one remedy may be required while 
in others one remedy only will suffice. 
Huscroft and Rishworth also note the unsettled nature of the law in Canada with contradictory 
decisions often found, some of which have been noted in this paper. They summarise the 
position in Canada by saying 
"It is surpnsmg to find that the law of damages as a Charter remedy remams 
undeveloped, 13 years following passage of the Charter. Indeed, the insignificance of the 
damage remedy in Canadian Constitutional Law is reflected in the fact that the leading 
constitutional authority in Canada deals with its availability in one sentence." 121 
(c) United States 
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In the United States claims for breaches of the constitutional guaranteed human rights are seen 
as claims in private law or tort and not as claims in public law. 
In 1961 the Supreme Court in Munroe v Papem. held that a plaintiff whose constitutional rights 
have been infringed by a person or persons acting under the colour of state law can bring a 
federal cause of action even where the state provided an adequate remedy through its common 
law or tort. In that case the plaintiff and his family, who were Negroes, had been subjected to 
a search that was clearly unreasonable by a large party of police. The plaintiff was then taken 
to a police station, interrogated for an unnecessarily long period of time and was not brought 
before a court at the first reasonable opportunity. The case was an important milestone in civil 
rights litigation because it meant that plaintiffs were not forced to sue in state courts where 
even although technically remedies might be available judges or juries were reluctant to give 
judgments for Negro plaintiffs. The cause of action was under section 1983 of a Civil Rights 
Act passed by Congress in 1871 during the reconstruction of the southern states following the 
American Civil War. Federal attempts to extend civil and political rights to newly emancipated 
Negroes were often frustrated by state officials in the states of the recently defeated 
Confederacy and so led Congress to pass the Civil Rights Act 18 71. 
After Munro v Pape there were a deluge of civil actions against state officials who acting under 
the guise of state laws were alleged to have deprived persons of their constitutional rights. In 
an article Professor Whitman noted : 
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"In 1976, almost one of every three "private" federal question suits filed in the federal 
courts was a civil rights action against the state or local official. 
This explosion of actions has become a subject of considerable comment and 
consternation. Among those most concerned are many judges of the federal courts. 
During recent years federal judges have elaborated various doctrines that, in purpose or 
effect, discourage section 1983 litigants and dispose of specific cases: standing; 
exhaustion; immunity; abstention; interpretation of the 11 th amendment; res judicata; as 
365 us 167 
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well as close construction of the statutory language, of the scope of the constitutional 
rights, and of the elements of a cause of action. . .. this doctrinal complexity has turned 
section 1983 litigation into an elaborate and often unpredictable game." 123 
In 1978 the Supreme Court circumscribed the right to obtain exemplary damages in Carey v 
Piphus124 . In that case a number of students suspended from school without being given a 
hearing filed claims against school officials in a district of Illinois seeking declarations and 
injunctive relief together with actual and punitive or exemplary damages. The plaintiffs argued 
that they were entitled to punitive or exemplary damages for breach of their constitutional 
rights per se even if they could not prove actual damage. The court awarded the plaintiffs 
nominal damages not exceeding one dollar. The court followed traditional common law 
doctrines with Justice Powell, in a judgment of the court saying 
"Common-law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain "absolute" 
rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the award of a nominal 
sum of money. By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal damages 
without proof of actual injury, the law recognises the importance to organise society that 
those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the 
principle that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury 
or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, to deter or punish malicious 
deprivations of rights." 125 
Munro v Pape and Carey v Piphus were examples of actions brought against state officials 
under a particular section of the Civil Rights Act 1871 for breach of constitutional rights. There 
is no analogous provision in the American Constitution for actions against federal officials who 
breach constitutional rights and so the courts developed a remedy in damages that could be 
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implied from the Constitution without a remedy needing to be enacted by Congress. The 
seminal case is the 1971 decision Bivens v Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau 
of Narcotics126 where a party of police in exercising a search warrant had virtually demolished 
a house. Damages were sought on the basis that the narcotics agents had contravened the 
plaintiff's constitutional rights by an unreasonable search. The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provided a guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure but 
there was no remedies provision. In the decision Justice Brennan said: 
"That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, 
damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests 
in liberty ... Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its 
enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But 
"it is ... well settled where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides 
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy 
to make good the wrong done." 127 
Also, in his judgment Harlan J noted that on the assumption that Bivens was innocent the rule 
excluding evidence obtained by an unlawful search was simply irrelevant and so "For people 
in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing." 128 
In 1980 in Carlson v Green129 the court held that punitive damages were available in a Bivens 
type action with Brennan J saying130 
126 
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remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts,' ... and are especially 
appropriate to redress the violation by a government official of a citizen's constitutional 
rights. Moreover, punitive damages are available in a 'proper' section 1983 action ... " 
By a 'proper' section 1983 action the court meant an action where the plaintiffs could show 
actual damage. Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth in their survey of damages for breach of 
individual rights131 say that this decision is the high water mark for Bivens actions and that they 
doubt if this case would be decided the same way now as the Supreme Court has since moved 
to restrict the availability of Bivens actions. 
In subsequent decisions the Supreme Court in cases such as Schweiker v Chilicky132 and FDIC 
v Meyer133 limited the availability of Bivens type actions by expanding the caveats Brennan J 
placed on the action in Bivens itself, namely whether there were special factors counselling 
hesitation and where there was another effective remedy established by Congress. 
8. Conclusion 
As can be seen the New Zealand Courts have restored the vitality to the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 which Professor Paciocco complained 134 Parliament had removed. 
This issue of what type of damages can be obtained in an action founded on Bai gent's case has 
still to be resolved. Punitive damages are available in the Irish, Canadian and United States 
jurisdictions but there the issue of damages for breach of constitutional rights is treated as being 
a private law remedy rather than a public law one. Exemplary or punitive damages have been 
established as a remedy for tort violation in private law. It seems unlikely that the Baigent 
remedy will encompass punitive or exemplary damages given the indications in Maharaj and 
other Privy Council decisions that they are not available in public law damages claims. 
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However, notwithstanding some judicial reluctance to see damages as anything other than 
compensatory, damages may be available to vindicate the infringement of the right and to deter 
breaches as indicated by Cooke P in Bai gent 's case . 135 
There are of course many cases where there is little or no actual damage so that if damages 
were limited to being merely compensatory, plaintiffs in some cases, where no criminal charges 
resulted from the breach, would be without an effective remedy. If compensation as 
contemplated by Cooke P were able to be awarded it would be difficult to draw any meaningful 
distinction between exemplary or punitive damages available in tort actions and compensation 
made to vindicate rights or to deter breaches awarded as public law compensation. Indeed, 
Halsbury observes that while there is a distinction between the concepts of compensation and 
damages, the principles applicable to the measure of damages apply equally to the measure of 
compensation. 136 
This significance of the remedy being a remedy in public law rather than in private law means 
that the usual defences under the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 are no longer available. Given 
that the remedy is one by way of a direct claim against the Crown issues such as whether 
servants of the Crown were acting in the course of their employment are also irrelevant. The 
scope of the remedy was noted in an article by John Miller137 where he observed : 
"In a bill of rights claim there is no question of vicarious liability and therefore the 
defence is normally raised by the crown against vicarious liability claims are ineffective. 
Also ineffective is the bar on damages claims in the accident compensation legislation." 
The Act is now a potent weapon not only in the hands of criminal practitioners through its use 
in the exclusion of evidence but also in the ability to claim damages from government agencies 
for breach of ordinary rules of criminal procedure where other remedies are not available or for 
breach of the various rules of natural justice. The scope of the ability to claim for damages or 
135 
136 
137 
:85385 I 
N2 , P 678 
12 Halsbury' s Laws of England (4 th Edition) paragraphs 11 03 and 1126 
John Miller "Seeking Compensation fo r Bi ll of Rights Breaches" Vol I , Human Rights Law and Practice at 
page 211 
45 
monetary compensation has been further extended by Whithair v Attorney-General and the 
potential for claims has grown accordingly. 
In a recent article, Sir Ivor Richardson, now president of the Court of Appeal, referred to the 
flood of cases matching the Canadian experience. The impact of the act was dramatically 
illustrated by Sir Ivor's comment that 
"A further statistical reflection is that the volume of Charter cases has steadily increased 
in Canada and now constitutes one quarter of the Supreme Court of Canada's annual 
output of decided cases. That is about the same percentage as for Bill of Rights cases in 
the United States Supreme Court. 138 
The fact that damages are now clearly available for breaches of the Bill of Rights, even where 
there is no element of bad faith, means that the trickle of cases identified by the Law 
Commission as having been filed since Bai gent 's case may well turn into a flood . 
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